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Punitive Damages in Libel Cases After
Browning-Ferris t
by
P. CAMERON DEVORE and MARSHALL J. NELSON*
Introduction
Earlier this year, in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc.,' the Supreme Court decided that punitive damage awards
in private civil actions are not barred by the excessive fines clause of the
eighth amendment.2 However, the Court left open the possibility that
such awards may violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and all but solicited an appropriate case for review on that
ground.' This Article explores the reasons why that "appropriate case"
should arise from a libel action-one involving public figures and public
issues-and why punitive damages should be prohibited in such cases
under both the fourteenth and the first amendments.
Part I examines the background of the Browning-Ferris decision and
the positions of the individual Justices on the punitive damages issue;
Part II surveys the Court's prior treatment of punitive damages in its
libel decisions; Part III sets out the first amendment arguments against
punitive damages in libel cases, with particular emphasis on the decisions
t © Copyright 1990 by P. Cameron DeVore and Marshall J. Nelson.
* Messrs. DeVore and Nelson are partners in the Seattle office of Davis Wright Tre-
maine. They represented media organizations as amici curiae in Browning-Ferris Indus. of
Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); and, most recently, in Newton v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., cur-
rently pending before the Ninth Circuit, Nos. 89-55220, 89-55285 (9th Cir.). They also repre-
sented CBS Inc. and Walter Jacobson on appeal in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), and on the petition for certiorari of that case, which
was denied sub. nom. CBS Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988).
Portions of this Article appeared previously as part of the LDRC Special Report Punitive
Damages in Libel Actions, published by the Libel Defense Resource Center, LDRC Bulletin
No. 24, Dec. 15, 1988. The authors wish to thank Henry R. Kaufman, Executive Director of
LDRC, and his staff for their assistance with the original publication, and to acknowledge the
valuable contributions of Laura J. Buckland, Assistant Professor, University of Washington
School of Law, to the fourteenth amendment sections of this Article.
1. 109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
3. 109 S. Ct. at 2921.
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in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.4 and its progeny; Part IV examines these
arguments in the context of the fourteenth amendment; and Part V sum-
marizes the public policy arguments against punitive damages, conclud-
ing that the costs to society, especially in first amendment terms, far




Browning-Ferris was an antitrust case, alleging violations of section
2 of the Sherman Act and interference with contractual relations in viola-
tion of Vermont tort law. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff of
$51,146 in compensatory damages and awarded $6,000,000 in punitive
damages on the state law claim.5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments by Browning-Ferris that
the punitive damages award constituted an excessive fine prohibited by
the eighth amendment. 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
punitive damages issue.7
This was the third time in as many years that the Court accepted
review of a case challenging the constitutionality of punitive damages
under the eighth amendment. In the first, Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie,' the Court did not reach the constitutionality issue, but noted
"these arguments raise important issues which, in an appropriate setting,
must be resolved." 9 In the second, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cren-
shaw,1 ° the Court once again refused to decide the issue without a more
complete record from the lower courts, but there were strong signals
from at least two of the Justices that the argument might receive a sym-
pathetic hearing on due process grounds. Justice O'Connor, in a concur-
ring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, argued that "the Court should
scrutinize carefully the procedures under which punitive damages are
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
5. 109 S. Ct. at 2913. The District Court denied Browning-Ferris's motions for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, or remittitur, and awarded Kelco $153,438 in
treble damages and $212,500 in attorney's fees and costs on the antitrust claim, or, in the
alternative, $6,066,082.74 in compensatory and punitive damages on the state-law claim. Id.
6. Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, 845 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.
1988).
7. 109 S. Ct. 527 (1988).
8. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
9. Id. at 828.
10. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
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awarded in civil lawsuits," and suggested "there is reason to think that
[they] may violate the Due Process Clause.""
In Browning-Ferris, the petitioner chose to proceed almost exclu-
sively on the eighth amendment arguments, 2 and the Supreme Court
obliged with a scholarly dissertation and debate on the historical ante-
cedents of the Excessive Fines Clause. Although the end result was a
majority opinion holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the eighth
amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards in cases between
private parties, 13 and a dissenting opinion arguing that it does apply, 4
there was virtual unanimity of opinion that the decision "leaves the door
open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition
of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private parties."' 5
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, acknowledged existing
Supreme Court authority for the view "that the Due Process Clause
places outer limits on the size of a civil damage award made pursuant to
a statutory scheme.... " However, he deferred action on the question of
"whether due process acts as a check on undue jury discretion to award
punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit," because
the issue had not been adequately raised in the lower courts.' 6
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred that the due
process issue was not properly before the Court, but criticized the major-
ity's hesitancy on the issue: "I should think that, if anything, our scru-
tiny of awards made without the benefit of a legislature's deliberation and
guidance would be less indulgent than our consideration of those that fall
within statutory limits."'" Noting that the guidance given juries in deter-
mining punitive damages awards 'is scarcely better than no guidance at
all," he concluded: "I for one would look longer and harder at an award
of punitive damages based on such skeletal guidance than I would at one
situated within a range of penalties as to which responsible officials had
deliberated and then agreed."'"
11. Id. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). Justices O'Connor and Scalia con-
curred in the judgment because of the abbreviated record and argument on the issue of puni-
tive damages.
12. See Petition for Certiorari at 1, Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. 2909, presenting the ques-
tion for review as "[w]hether an award of $6,000,000 in punitive damages, amounting to more
than 100 times the plaintiffs' actual damages from a purely economic tort, is excessive under
the Eighth Amendment or otherwise." Browning-Ferris argued that due process concerns were
inherent in the eighth amendment issue and within the "clear intendment" of objections raised
in the lower court proceedings, but the Court disagreed. See 109 S. Ct. at 2921 n.23.
13. Id. at 2912-23.
14. Id. at 2924-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
15. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 2921.
17. Id. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
18. Id.
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Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, expressly concurred
with Justice Brennan's view "that nothing in the Court's opinion fore-
closes a due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the
method by which they are imposed .. ". ."I' She voiced concern over
"skyrocketing" punitive damage awards unlimited by any set of objective
standards, and reiterated her earlier position in Bankers Life that "[t]his
grant of wholly standardless discretion to determine the severity of pun-
ishment appears inconsistent with due process."20
Considering the opinions in both Bankers Life and Browning-Ferris,
it appears that a clear majority of the Court is prepared to consider con-
stitutional limitations on the award of punitive damages solely as a mat-
ter of due process. Although there are obvious perils in "judge counting"
as a means of predicting future Supreme Court action, every current
member of the Court, with the exception of Justice Kennedy,2' has re-
cently authored or joined in an opinion questioning the propriety of puni-
tive damages.22
Given the fact that due process concerns are subject to even greater
scrutiny where first amendment rights are threatened, 23 and that some of
the Court's most searching criticism of punitive damages has occurred in
its earlier libel opinions, 24 it seems reasonable to conclude that the
19. Id. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20. 486 U.S. at 89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
21. Justice Kennedy did not join the Court until February 18, 1988, and, therefore, did
not participate in any of the punitive damages decisions prior to Browning-Ferris. In that case,
he joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion.
22. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 774 (1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, dissenting); id. at 771 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., joined by Justice Scalia, concurring
in part); Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924 (O'Connor, J., joined by Justice Stevens, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2607 n.5 (1989)
(White, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. E.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
24. Although the primary focus of this discussion is on punitive damages, it is impossible
to ignore the equally arbitrary and unrestrained amounts that are awarded in libel cases under
the label of presumed damages. As the Court recognized in Gertz, most of the constitutional
objections to punitive damages apply with equal force to presumed damages, and much of the
Court's criticism is leveled at "presumed and punitive damages" together. See Gertz, 418 U.S.
at 349-50.
It can be argued convincingly that the doctrine of presumed damages, which allows recov-
ery without evidence of actual injury, was effectively laid to rest in Gertz. Presumed damages
in libel cases are nothing more than a vestigial aspect of strict liability, clearly prohibited by
the court in Gertz. Strict liability under the common law of libel resulted from a finding that
speech in question was "libelous per se," from which the jury was allowed to presume falsity,
malice, and damages. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 371-75 (White, J., dissenting). See generally R.
SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 39-43, 94-96 (1980).
Although the Court set out the common law rationale for presumed damages in Dun &
Bradstreet, the authorities cited all predate Gertz and in some cases even New York Times v.
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Supreme Court will impose further constitutional restrictions on punitive
damage awards in libel cases, especially where public figures and public
issues are involved.
II
Punitive Damages in Prior Supreme Court
Libel Decisions
The problem of unrestrained damage awards in libel cases has been
a constant theme for almost twenty-five years in the Supreme Court's
effort to reconcile the common law of libel with competing first amend-
ment limitations. Beginning in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,25 the
Court recognized that the threat of unrestrained punitive damages raises
severe constitutional problems as "a form of regulation that creates
hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend
reliance upon the criminal law." 26 The Court noted the disparity be-
tween the $500,000 civil judgment against The New York Times and the
$500 criminal fine that would have applied to the same conduct, and
questioned the lack of procedural safeguards that would have applied in
a criminal case.27 The Court's answer in the Sullivan case, however, was
to address the issue of liability itself, leaving the matter of damages to
another day.28
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,29 the Court initially rejected the
argument that unlimited punitive damages were barred by the first
amendment. Justice Harlan, announcing the judgment of the Court in
an opinion joined by only three Justices, concluded, inter alia, that the
finding of "ill will" required for an award of punitive damages under
general libel law, coupled with the heightened standard of liability an-
nounced by the Court, was sufficient protection for publishers' first
amendment rights. This rationale was short-lived, however. First, the
standard of liability contemplated by Justice Harlan was not the actual
malice rule of New York Times v. Sullivan, but a standard of "highly
unreasonable conduct" which was rejected by a majority of the Court."
Sullivan, and amount to a simple restatement of the libel per se rule. See Dun & Bradstreet,
472 U.S. at 760. In any case involving a matter of public interest brought by either a private or
public plaintiff, the rationale should not pass muster under Gertz.
25. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. Id. at 278 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963)).
27. 376 U.S. at 277.
28. Recently, Justice White questioned the wisdom of this approach, suggesting instead
that presumed and punitive damages might have been prohibited as an alternative means of
first amendment protection. See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 771 (White, J., concurring).
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
30. Id. at 155.
1989]
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The "ill will" requirement on which Justice Harlan relied was therefore
inconsistent with the actual malice rule ultimately adopted by the
Court.3 1
More importantly, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,32 Justice
Harlan himself expressly retreated from his earlier position in Butts:
"Reflection has convinced me that my earlier opinion [in Butts] painted
with somewhat too broad a brush and that a more precise balancing of
the conflicting interests involved is called for in this delicate area."' 33 Af-
ter lengthy analysis, he concluded: "I would hold unconstitutional, in a
private libel case, jury authority to award punitive damages which is un-
confined by the requirement that these awards bear a reasonable and pur-
poseful relationship to the actual harm done."34
In the same case, Justices Marshall and Stewart concluded that pu-
nitive damages should be prohibited altogether in libel cases involving
matters of public interest. They recognized that punitive damages
[s]erve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect private
fines. Unlike criminal penalties, however, punitive damages are not
awarded within discernible limits but can be awarded in almost any
amount. Since there is not even an attempt to offset any palpable loss
and since these damages are the direct product of the ancient theory of
unlimited jury discretion, the only limit placed on the jury in awarding
punitive damages is that the damages not be "excessive," and in some
jurisdictions that they bear some relationship to the amount of com-
pensatory damages awarded. [Citation omitted.] The manner in
which unlimited discretion may be exercised is plainly unpredictable.
3 5
These dissenting opinions became the touchstone of the majority
opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,36 where the Court concluded that
"punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies
a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not com-
pensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries
.... ,3' The Court, therefore, held that "the States may not permit re-
covery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not
based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the
truth.
38
31. Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 170 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 172
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct.
2678, 2685 (1989) ("The proposed standard, however, was emphatically rejected by a majority
of the Court in favor of the stricter New York Times actual malice rule.").
32. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
33. Id. at 72 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 77.
35. Id. at 82-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
36. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. 418 U.S. at 350.
38. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
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It is important to stress at this point that the Court in Gertz did not
hold that presumed or punitive damages would automatically flow when-
ever actual malice could be shown; the question simply was not dis-
cussed. In context, it is clear that this language was used by the Court to
confine its analysis and holding in Gertz to private figure libel cases where
actual malice could not be shown. 9
Most recently, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.,' Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, reasserted the constitutional objections to punitive
awards discussed in Rosenbloom and Gertz. Justice Brennan stressed the
"largely uncontrolled discretion" of juries to assess damages "in wholly
unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm
caused" as a substantial reason for the limitations imposed in Gertz.41
He also noted that these objections to punitive damages are not confined
solely to first amendment cases. Citing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent-
ing opinion in Smith v. Wade,42 he wrote:
These cases, like Gertz, recognize that "the alleged deterrence achieved
by punitive damages awards is likely outweighed by the costs-such as
the encouragement of unnecessary litigation and the chilling of desira-
ble conduct-flowing from the rule, at least when the standards on
which the awards are based are ill defined.",
43
The importance of the dissenting opinions in Dun & Bradstreet
should not be overlooked. According to the plurality opinion, the case
involved a purely private libel of a private individual, thus demanding far
39. Id. at 350. It is also possible that Justice Powell, whose opinion for the Court drew
heavily from Justice Harlan's analysis in Rosenbloom, was simply paraphrasing the following
observation by Justice Harlan: "At a minimum, even in the purely private libel area, I think
the First Amendment should be construed to limit the imposition of punitive damages to those
situations where actual malice is proved." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). If so, it is even clearer that the rule in Gertz was intended as the least-i.e.,
the minimum-protection permissible under the first amendment, and that further restrictions
on libel damages might be required in other cases. It must also be noted that Justice Harlan,
even in Rosenbloom, persisted in his earlier view that "actual malice" incorporated traditional
concepts of malicious conduct:
This [actual malice] is the typical standard employed in accessing anyone's liability
for punitive damages where the underlying aim of the law is to compensate for harm
actually caused, [citations omitted] and no conceivable state interest could justify
imposing a harsher standard on the exercise of those freedoms that are given explicit
protection by the first amendment.
Id. The narrower definition espoused by Justice Powell and the majority of the Court, without
the elements of "ill will" and intent to harm, would not fit with Justice Harlan's logic. It
would, in fact, impose a harsher standard of liability on the exercise of first amendment free-
doms than that imposed on other non-protected conduct. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
40. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
41. Id. at 778 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350).
42. 461 U.S. at 59.
43. 472 U.S. at 780 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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less constitutional protection than publications involving matters of pub-
lic interest. Yet even in this purely private context, four members of the
Court objected to the award of punitive damages." A fifth member, Jus-
tice White, suggested that first amendment interests might be served by
limiting or entirely prohibiting presumed and punitive damages, as an
alternative to the New York Times rule.45 And now a sixth member,
Justice O'Connor, who originally joined the plurality opinion in Dun &
Bradstreet, has declared her belief that unrestrained punitive damages
violate due process.46
Clearly, "the Supreme Court has shown a dislike for the use of puni-
tive damages in cases involving First Amendment rights . . . ."' Only
once in the twenty-plus years since Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,4" has
the Court affirmed such an award49 and that was in a case of "speech
involving no matters of public concern," and thus "speech of signifi-
cantly less constitutional interest." It has not yet confronted punitive
damages in the context of speech at the opposite end of the scale, i.e.,
speech involving both public figures and public issues, where the balance




The First Amendment Argument Against Punitive
Damages in Libel Cases
The constitutional objections to punitive damages are a common
and consistent thread running through all the Supreme Court's libel deci-
sions since New York Times v. Sullivan, wherein the Court imposed the
actual malice requirement for public figure libel cases. 5 ' The current
constitutional argument, however, begins with Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. in 1974. In that case, the Court characterized its prior libel deci-
44. Id. at 774.
45. Id. at 771 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
46. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
47. Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 478 (9th Cir. 1977).
48. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See discussion at notes 29-31, supra.
49. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757, 760.
50. The Court has had several recent opportunities to address the issue in sharp focus in
this context but has denied certiorari in each case. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988), a $3,050,000 libel
judgment in favor of a public figure corporation consisted entirely of presumed and punitive
damages. And in P.G. Publishing Co. v. DiSalle, 544 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Super. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989), a $2,000,000 punitive award in favor of a judicial candidate was
imposed, in part, because of the defendant's "particular disregard for its responsibilities as a
major news gathering and conveying source." DiSalle, 544 A.2d at 1376.
51. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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sions as a struggle "to define the proper accommodation between the law
of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the
First Amendment."52 It then defined the task as a balancing of first
amendment interests against "[t]he legitimate state interest underlying
the law of libel... the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted
on them by defamatory falsehood."53 That interest, the Court stressed,
"extends no further than compensation for actual injury." 4 The Court
even suggested that in the absence of such a state interest, "this Court
would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters
enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for
defamation."55
Applying the balance, the Gertz Court held that the reputation of a
private individual involved in a matter of public interest was entitled to
greater protection than that afforded by the New York Times actual mal-
ice rule and left the states free to fashion their own rules within a consti-
tutional prohibition against liability without fault.5 6 Addressing the
question of damages, however, the Court declared:
[T]he doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular
opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by
the publication of a false fact. More to the point, the States have no
substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gra-
tuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.57
And on the specific subject of punitive damages, the Court said:
Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award puni-
tive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-cen-
sorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly
irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for
private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury.58
When the issue of libel damages arose again, in Dun & Bradstreet v.
Greenmoss Builders," the Court expressly adopted the balancing ap-
proach set forth in Gertz to "balance the State's interest in compensating
private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First
Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression."'  The Court
reaffirmed the lack of a substantial state interest in awarding presumed
and punitive damages where issues of public concern are involved "in
52. 418 U.S. at 325.
53. Id. at 341.
54. Id. at 348-49.
55. Id. at 341.
56. Id. at 347.
57. Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
59. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
60. Id. at 757.
19891
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view of their effect on speech at the core of First Amendment concern. ' 61
Where no issue of public concern is involved, however, Justice Powell,
writing for a mere plurality of the Court, found that the state interest in
awarding presumed and punitive damages is substantial, "relative to the
incidental effect these remedies may have on speech of significantly less
constitutional interest."62 As previously noted,63 four members of the
Court took strong exception to the award of such damages under this
reasoning. The two remaining justices, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
White, created a majority by concurring in the judgment, but called for
reexamination of both Gertz and New York Times. Justice White sug-
gested that presumed and punitive damages might be prohibited alto-
gether as an alternative means of constitutional protection in lieu of the
New York Times rule.6
Despite the doubts expressed by Justices White and Burger, the
Court in both Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet strongly reaffirmed constitu-
tional protection under the New York Times rule for speech on matters of
public concern and speech involving public officials and public figures.65
Under the balancing approach espoused by both cases, the first amend-
ment interest in encouraging "'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' de-
bate on public issues' 66 is at its strongest, and the state interest in
providing any recovery beyond compensation for actual provable injury
is at its weakest, in a public official/public figure libel suit.
A. The State Interest in Awarding Punitive Damages Is Weakest Where
Commentary on Public Issues and Public Figures Is Involved
Any justifications that may be offered for punitive damages in the
context of a purely private libel case are substantially undercut where
matters of public concern and criticism of public figures are involved.
Even in a private figure case involving speech of public interest, the
Court in Gertz recognized that "the legitimate state interest in compen-
sating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation ... extends
no further than compensation for actual injury, ,67 and found no substan-
61. Id. at 760.
62. Id.
63. See text accompanying at notes 40-43, supra.
64. See discussion in Part II, supra.
65. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-41; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59. The Court also
reaffirmed the vitality of the New York Times rule in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989).
66. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270).
67. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
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tial state interest in awarding damages in excess of the compensation
amount.68
Stated simply, the only state interest to be accommodated in this
type of case is compensation for actual injury to reputation, "supported
by competent evidence concerning the injury."69 Where speech is "at the
core of First Amendment concern," i.e., where it involves subjects of
public concern, "the state interest in awarding presumed and punitive
damages ... [is] not 'substantial.' "70
It is also inescapable that presumed and punitive damages in libel
cases deter speech and that the states have no legitimate interest in dis-
couraging speech on public issues. The underlying theme of the Supreme
Court's libel decisions since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan has been the
need to encourage free and open debate and to prevent self-censorship.7
In addition, as clearly stated in Gertz, the state interest in providing
compensation in any form to a public figure libel plaintiff is diminished
by the fact that public figures usually have greater access to the media to
counter false publicity.72 It was precisely the lack of such access by pri-
vate figures and the perceived need to provide another remedy that led
the Court in Gertz to permit recovery under a lesser standard than the
New York Times rule.73 Even there, however, the Court limited recovery
to compensation for actual injury. Where the libel plaintiff is a public
official or public figure with the ability to command media attention,
there is no comparable state interest substantial enough to outweigh the
heightened first amendment protection required by the Supreme Court.
B. First Amendment Interests Are Strongest Where Commentary on Public
Issues and Public Figures Is Involved
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
speech on "matters of public concern" . . . is "at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection." . . . "[S]peech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Ac-
cordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public
68. Id. at 349-50.
69. Id.
70. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760.
71. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-20 (1931).
72. The Court in Gertz noted:
The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help--using available opportuni-
ties to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse
impact on reputation .... [P]ublic figures usually enjoy significantly greater access
to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportu-
nity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.
418 U.S. at 344. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
73. 418 U.S. at 344.
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issues occupies the "highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values" and is entitled to special protection.
74
The Court's decisions generally acknowledge that discussion of gov-
ernmental affairs and public officials are entitled to the highest level of
first amendment protection, on the rationale that one of the most impor-
tant functions of the media is to inform the public about the workings of
government.15 But even where speech concerns the activities of a public
figure who is not a public official, the balance weighs heavily in favor of
free speech:
[U]ninhibited debate about [public figures'] involvement in public is-
sues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 'public officials'....
[Plublic opinion may be the only instrument by which society can at-
tempt to influence their conduct.
76
And where speech on public issues is in the form of commentary, criti-
cism, and opinion, the need for broad protection is even greater. Such
commentary is not only "entitled to the most exacting degree of First
Amendment protection"; 77 it is also the most likely to include the kind of
"vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks" on public
conduct that trigger the wrath of plaintiffs and juries alike and increase
the risk of irrational and excessive damages awards.78
In short, the Supreme Court has found that each of the factors noted
above-discussion of public concerns, reporting of governmental activi-
ties, criticism of public officials and public figures, and commentary and
opinion-standing alone, demands the highest protection under the first
amendment. Where two or more of these factors are combined, it seems
that only the most compelling state interest could tip the scales in favor
of punitive damages. According to the Court, no such compelling inter-
est is present where the plaintiff is a public official or public figure.
C. The "Actual Malice" Problem
The Gertz Court's condemnation of presumed and punitive damages
would be enough, standing alone, to declare unconstitutional any award
of such damages in a libel case involving matters of public interest, were
it not for the qualifying language, "at least when liability is not based on
74. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59 (quoting First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
75. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Pape,
401 U.S. 279, 290-91 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11
(1970).
76. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 337.
77. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1984).
78. See Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."'7 9
This language was interpreted by the Seventh Circuit in Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson as a ruling by the Supreme Court that
presumed and punitive damages flow automatically where New York
Times actual malice can be shown.8 0 Other circuit courts have been less
hasty to assume this conclusion, but have continued to uphold punitive
awards, in some cases because of their uncertainty. For example, in Ma-
heu v. Hughes Tool Co., the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Supreme
Court "has left open the question of whether [punitive damages] can be
awarded in situations in which the high and protective standard of actual
malice has been met."'" The Second Circuit, in Buckley v. Littell,82 rec-
ognized that "[ilt may be that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., . . . and its
underlying concern ... will ultimately lead the Supreme Court to hold
that punitive damages cannot constitutionally be awarded to a public fig-
ure .... but felt compelled by its own prior decisions to permit punitive
damages "absent clear word from the Court to the contrary. "83
A closer reading of Gertz confirms the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the question is still open. There is no discussion of the relationship
between a finding of actual malice and the award of either presumed or
punitive damages, nor is there any suggestion that such an award would
be proper. There is only the Court's careful language confining its hold-
ing to cases involving "the private defamation plaintiff who establishes
liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York
Times."84 The issue still remains to be addressed.
There is a tempting, but deceptive, connection between the rationale
for punitive damages and a finding of actual malice. After all, what
could be more "malicious" than the intentional publication of calculated
falsehoods? But the connection is flawed in at least two respects. First,
because of confused application of the rule in the lower courts, the actual
malice rule is often treated as nothing more than a semantic hurdle easily
overcome by well-meaning juries and judges who feel compelled to com-
pensate the victim of what they view as unfair or irresponsible news cov-
erage. 5 All too often, the result is a mechanistic finding of "knowing
79. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
80. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273 (7th Cir.
1983).
81. 569 F.2d 459, 478 (9th Cir. 1977).
82. 539 F.2d 882, 897 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
83. Id. See also Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Carson v. Allied
News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 214 (7th Cir. 1976).
84. 418 U.S. at 350.
85. As Justice Douglas suggested in his dissent in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 359, the influence of
emotion and prejudice is not confined to the jury. Excessive libel awards may also reflect, in
part, "localized judicial distaste for certain publishers" and judges' "understandable, but con-
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falsehood" based on an interpretive comparison of the defendant's words
with all supposedly known facts, or a finding of "reckless disregard of the
truth" from circumstances that are merely negligent, at most. 86 When
such a finding is also allowed to determine the availability of punitive
damages, without any evidence of malice in the traditional sense, the end
result is punishment of speech on a lesser standard than is applied to the
award of punitive damages in other cases. Justice Harlan found such a
result unjustifiable under "[any] conceivable state interest."
87
Even when the actual malice rule is properly applied, it does not
necessarily reach the issue of whether the defendant's conduct is truly
"outrageous" and prompted by the "evil motives" normally required to
be shown before punitive damages may be awarded. 8 As several com-
mentators have noted,89 the requirement of actual malice in public figure
libel cases is a tool for defining the standard of liability, not the level of
damages. It focuses only on the defendant's attitude toward the facts,
and not on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff or any intent to
do harm. It is therefore possible to have a technical finding of actual
malice, as defined by New York Times, where there is absolutely no evi-
dence of malicious conduct in the common sense of the word. The jury is
then invited to award punitive damages without any further restric-
tions.90 This fact points to the second flaw in applying actual malice as
the test for determining both liability and availability of punitive
damages.
If actual malice alone is allowed to determine the availability of pu-
nitive damages, the end result is a rule that permits recovery of presumed
and punitive damages, regardless of malicious conduct, in all successful
public official/public figure libel cases, where first amendment protection
is supposed to be at its highest. Some might argue that the rule in its
stitutionally improper, distaste for the defendant's publication." Van Alstyne, First Amend-
ment Limitations on Recovery from the Press, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 801, 808 (1984).
See also Committee Report on Communications Law, Punitive Damages in Libel Actions, 42
REC. OF Assoc. OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK, 20, 32-36 (1987) [hereinafter Committee
Report].
86. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984);
Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6 (1970).
87. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403.U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1977).
89. See, e.g., Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 847, 854-55
(1985); Committee Report, supra note 85, at 32-36.
90. A recent study found that punitive damages were awarded in nearly 60% of recent
libel trials in which there was any finding of liability, compared to less than 10% in other types
of cases. See Libel Defense Resource Center, Recent Trends in Libel Damages Against the
Media, Bulletin No. 18, App. I (Dec. 15, 1986).
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original form was intended to reach only truly malicious conduct, 91 and
therefore, that liability will only be found in those cases where punish-
ment is deserved in the first place. It might also be argued that many
states recognize, as a matter of state law, that punitive damages are an
extreme remedy and must be supported by evidence of malicious conduct
beyond that required to establish liability. In libel cases this may trans-
late into a requirement that there be evidence of express malice, in addi-
tion to New York Times' actual malice.92 At least one commentator has
suggested this approach as a means of satisfying constitutional
restrictions.
93
The defect in both arguments lies in the ease with which any of these
highly subjective standards may be manipulated or misunderstood by a
sympathetic jury. As Professor Van Alstyne has observed:
A juror might suppose that if recklessness must be proved and if reck-
lessness also entitles the defendant [sic] to consideration of punitive
damages, then absent some exceptional reasons, the juror ought assur-
edly and quite routinely award punitive damages .. .
Whether the test is described as actual malice, express malice, or some
combination of both, there is no guarantee that juries will not find
"whatever they are told is necessary for them to find if they thoroughly
dislike the publisher, his publication, his general practices, or his
business." 95
91. In the earlier cases, the Supreme Court characterized actual malice in terms of "delib-
erate lies" and "calculated falsehoods" uttered with a "high degree of awareness of probable
falsity." See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Under these cases, it was
the "intent to inflict harm through falsehood" that demonstrated actual malice. Id. at 73. In
the Court's struggle to educate the lower courts that evidence of ill will, enmity, and intent to
inflict harm were not sufficient to establish actual malice, perception of the rule began to shift
away from any consideration of motive and intent. See Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks,
389 U.S. 81, 82 (1967); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965). A close reading of the earlier
cases, however, leaves a strong impression that the Court did, indeed, assume the existence of
truly malicious intent as almost inherent in its definition of actual malice. This argument is
probably moot, however, in light of the court's current formulation of the rule, as stated in
Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2685 n.7 (1989) ("The
phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to so with bad motive or
ill will.")
92. See Appleyard v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 539 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir. 1976); Buckley
v. Littell, 394 F. Supp. 918, 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), modified, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Selby v. Savard, 134 Ariz. 222, 655 P.2d 342, 348 (1982); Ven-
turi v. Savitt, Inc., 191 Conn. 588, 468 A.2d 933, 935 (1983); Matthews v. Deland State Bank,
334 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. App. 1976); Wood v. Lee, 41 A.D.2d 730, 731, 341 N.Y.S.2d 738,
739 (1973).
93. See Note, supra note 89, at 855-58, 860-62.
94. Van Alstyne, supra note 85, at 797.
95. Id. See also discussion of standards for award of punitive damages in Disalle, 544
A.2d at 1364-71.
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There is no easy resolution to the confusion, semantic and other-
wise, that has developed in application of the actual malice rule. Perhaps
the best answer is found in the decisions of the Supreme Court itself,
summarized by Justice Brennan in Dun & Bradstreet as the recognition
that the award of punitive damages in libel actions "is too blunt a regula-
tory instrument" to satisfy either due process concerns or first amend-
ment principles under any test.
96
IV
The Fourteenth Amendment Argument Against
Punitive Damages in Libel Cases
As Justice Brennan demonstrated in Dun & Bradstreet, the constitu-
tional objections to punitive damages in libel cases can be asserted with
equal conviction under the Due Process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In this sense, the only difference between a libel action and any
other case is the fact that the conduct being punished and deterred by
punitive damages is speech. The difference, of course, is significant.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that any form of state regu-
lation that restricts free speech demands heightened scrutiny of any due
process concerns. 97 The Court has also recognized that the award of
punitive damages in libel cases is a form of state regulation that is subject
to this constitutional restriction.9" The general rule was stated by the
Court in Speiser v. Randall:
When we deal with the complex of strands in the web of freedoms
which make up free speech, the operation and effect of the method by
which speech is sought to be restrained must be subjected to close analy-
sis and critical judgment in the light of the particular circumstances to
which it is applied. 99
These are essentially due process considerations, magnified and ulti-
mately subsumed in the First Amendment analysis." ° Yet, despite the
unavoidable risk of duplicate arguments, it is instructive to test "the op-
eration and effect" of the punitive damages process against traditional
due process principles.
96. 472 U.S. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
98. See New York Times Co. v, Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269. See also Dun & Bradstreet, 472
U.S. at 759.
99. 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1957) (emphasis added).
100. It is interesting to note that even when the Supreme Court has framed its analysis of
speech restrictions in due process terms, its conclusions have ultimately turned on first amend-
ment concerns. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 375 U.S. at 520.
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A. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects Against Arbitrary and Irrational
Punishment
"[T]he touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government."' ° In the first amendment con-
text, this translates into a requirement that economic burdens imposed
by a state be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest
and that they be imposed in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor irra-
tional.'0 2 Yet, the unlimited discretion exercised by juries in awarding
punitive damages in any kind of case invites awards that are unpredict-
able, arbitrary, and irrational. Some of the largest and most irrational
awards have occurred in libel cases where, in theory, first amendment
interests demand the greatest due process protection.103
The process whereby punishment is meted out in the form of dam-
ages in private civil lawsuits is, itself, irrational. The societal goals of
punishment and deterrence are traditionally and best served by the crimi-
nal justice process. The award of civil damages serves a different pur-
pose: "A fundamental premise of our civil legal system is the notion that
damages are awarded to compensate the victim-to redress injuries actu-
ally suffered."'"
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that punitive dam-
ages are not awarded to compensate for injury; that they are instead
quasi-criminal fines meant to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. 05
But the similarity between punitive damages and criminal fines does not
extend to the substantive laws and procedures under which the two are
assessed.
Punitive damage awards in the civil context evade the constitutional
protection of due process that would be required in a criminal case. The
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan observed:
A person charged with violation of this [criminal libel] statute en-
joys ordinary criminal-law safeguards such as the requirements of an
indictment and of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These safeguards
101. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923
(1989) (Brennan, J. concurring) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
102. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 520-21. See also Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.
42, 50 n.14 (1979); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 82-84 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
103. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 82-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Wheeler, The Con-
stitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 285-88
(1983).
104. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 57 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted).
105. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. See also Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 82 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(punitive damages "serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect private
fines"); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (punitive damages are "pri-
vate" fines and are "quasi-criminal"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
19891
are not available to the defendant in a civil action .... And since there
is no double-jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not
the only judgment that may be awarded . . . for the same
publications. 106
The idea that civil proceedings can avoid otherwise required protec-
tions has been expressly and repeatedly rejected by the courts. If a crimi-
nal fine is unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment, it cannot
magically be validated by calling it civil damages and allowing imposi-
tion of unlimited penalties under even less protection than would be re-
quired in the criminal context. The Supreme Court's lesson from its
early libel decisions is clear: "What a State may not constitutionally
bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of
its civil law of libel."'
10 7
Even if the absence of criminal due process protection could be
overlooked, fundamental fairness demands that punitive damages be pro-
portional to the severity of the act and that they be imposed evenhand-
edly to achieve their purposes of deterrence and retribution. 108 But
uncertainty over the amount of punitive damages that may be imposed,
combined with the great discretion afforded juries, undercuts both of
these goals. In fact, the random and arbitrary manner in which they are
assessed fails to assure that punitive damage awards further any legiti-
mate purpose. 09
Although some jurisdictions purport to impose limitations on puni-
tive damages and prohibit excessive awards, objective analysis typically
106. 376 U.S. at 277. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See
also Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139,
152-53 (1986) (due process should limit repetitive recoveries for the same wrongful conduct);
Wheeler, supra note 103, at 322-33 (1983) (suggesting application of fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments to punitive damages proceedings). Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S.
58, 69-71 (1963) (state regulation of "objectionable" publications circumvented safeguards of
the criminal process, "creat[ing] hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those
that attend reliance upon the criminal law.").
107. 376 U.S. at 277. See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 n.3 (1965) ("whether
the law be civil or criminal it must satisfy relevant constitutional standards"); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 684 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) ("[I]f it is constitutionally impermissi-
ble to cut off someone's ear for the commission of murder, it must be unconstitutional to cut
off a child's ear for being late to class."); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966)
(procedural protections are not avoided simply because a state chooses to fasten a label of
"civil" on its conduct).
108. Note, supra note 89, at 859.
109. See discussion supra at note 108, and infra at notes 110 and 112; Note, supra note 89,
at 859-60; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages.: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 666 (1980); Wheeler, supra note 103 at 309 ("Because the current punitive damages
system creates substantial risks of both overdeterrence and underdeterrence, the government's
interest weighs for ...procedural reform."); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 373 ("Freewheeling
discretion ... the utility in fostering society's interests in protecting individuals from defama-
tion is at best vague and uncertain.").
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plays little or no role in a jury's determination. 110 Instead, the jury is
invited, even encouraged, to "sting" the defendant, with the only limita-
tion being the jury's perception of the defendant's wealth. It is not sur-
prising that the rule against excessive punitive damages often translates
into a mechanical calculation of the defendant's net worth and a percent-
age of that worth represented by the punitive award. Thus, multi-million
dollar awards against large corporate defendants may pass a "net worth"
test, despite the lack of any reasonable relationship to the actual harm
caused or to fines that may be imposed as criminal punishments for the
same conduct."I' Such a rule is not merely inconsistent with, it is anti-
thetical to, the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment. Where due
process demands evenhandedness and predictability, punitive damages
are assessed in "wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary rela-
tion to the actual harm caused." '112 In fact, they are often thousands of
times greater than comparable criminal sanctions. For example, in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court noted that the judgment of
$500,00O-fairly modest in light of today's megaverdicts-"was one
thousand times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Alabama
criminal statute.., and one hundred times greater than that provided by
the Sedition Act."' '" In other cases, multi-million dollar punitive dam-
age awards have been imposed even where there was no evidence of ac-
tual damage." 4 When punitive damage awards bear no relation to the
actual harm suffered or the culpability of defendants, they are inherently
arbitrary and capricious, and should be prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment.
110. Wheeler, supra note 103, at 311 ("Prevailing punitive damages procedures ... often
ensure that there will be no relationship between culpability and punishment.").
111. The stated rationale for these apparently irrational results is that the punitive award
must carry sufficient "sting" to punish the wrongdoer and deter future wrongful conduct. See,
e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 73 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note,
supra note 89, at 849. However, the same interests in punishment and deterrence have been
addressed in numerous legislative enactments that do not begin to approach such destructive
measures. The use of statutory damages, enhanced damages, and similar remedial measures in
excess of actual damages have been deemed sufficient by Congress to serve these interests.
Compare, for example, the alternative judgments offered by the District Court in Browning-
Ferris--either $153,438 in treble damages and $212,500 in attorney's fees and costs on the
federal antitrust claim, or $6,066,082.74 in "compensatory and punitive damages" on the
state-law claim, both for the same conduct. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 290.
112. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
113. 376 U.S. at 277.
114. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F. Supp. 1240 (N.D.
Ii. 1986) (judgment notwithstanding the verdict reducing compensatory damages to one dol-
lar, but sustaining $2,050,000 punitive damage award), modified on appeal, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 632 F.
Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ($1 compensatory damages, $1,600,000 punitive damages), rev'd,
800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1303 (1987).
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment Requires Adequate Procedural Safeguards
Even if these substantive infirmities could be overcome, due process
also requires that the procedures by which economic burdens are im-
posed be "adequate to safeguard against infringement of constitutionally
protected rights. . .. " 15 The uncontrolled discretion of juries to deter-
mine whether and how much punitive damages ought to be awarded in a
given case "create[s] a serious risk of error in determining the size of
punitive damages awards,"' 16 and defies the procedural protections guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendment.
Also implicit in the procedural safeguards of due process is the fun-
damental concept that government will impose economic sanctions only
in accordance with understandable legal standards." 7 The standards by
which juries determine whether punitive damages should be awarded are
vague and vary widely from state to state. Multi-million dollar awards of
punitive damages are usually based on a jury's determination of whether
the defendant's conduct was sufficiently "reprehensible" or "outrageous"
to deserve them. I" But in those cases where the standards for liability in
the first instance are couched in similar terms, such as actual malice, the
jury, without further guidance, may pick and choose among defendants
who under the law may all be liable." 9
115. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958). See Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2924
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("nothing in the Court's opinion
forecloses a due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they
are imposed") (emphasis added).
116. Wheeler, supra note 103 at 285.
117. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966).
118. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
Outrageousness in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent subjec-
tiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the
jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expres-
sion. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to
allow damages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse
emotional impact on the audience.
Id. at 55. The context was a claim that Hustler's satirization of Reverend Falwell was so
outrageous as to be beyond first amendment protection, but the same reasoning should apply
to claims of "outrageous" conduct as a basis for awards of punitive damages, where the con-
duct in question is speech and/or publication.
119. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51-52 (1983). Depending on the level of scienter
required for .liability, punitive damages can be virtually automatic upon a general finding of
liability. The breadth of standards upon which states permit punitive damages often encroach
upon the very same standards for determining liability in the first instance. Id. Nowhere is
this problem more acute than in the libel context where in all public official/public figure cases
once a jury has determined that a libel defendant acted with actual malice these damages tend
to flow automatically. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d
1119 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302 (1988). The jurors then have "free-wheeling
discretion" to selectively punish unpopular speech and speakers. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The
end result is often exactly the type of content-based punishment that the first amendment
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This lack of adequate standards often yields bizarre results. For ex-
ample, in McCoy v. Hearst Corp., the jury returned identical verdicts of
$1,000,000 "compensatory" and $520,000 punitive damages to each of
the three different plaintiffs and apportioned the awards among the news-
paper, its reporter, and a freelance journalist in similarly symmetrical
fashion. 120 In the view of two commentators, only "anger and the sym-
metry of round numbers" could explain the verdicts:
In light of the Court of Appeal's strong suggestion that the free-
lance journalist, the "fabricator" of the major charges against the
plaintiffs, was substantially more culpable than the newspaper and the
other reporter, why were both the compensatory and punitive awards
against the free-lancer identical to those against the less blameworthy
reporter? Why, indeed, was the guilty free-lancer called upon to pay
only half as much to "compensate" the plaintiffs as was the relatively
passive newspaper defendant? Did the deep pocket of one weigh pre-
cisely twice as much as the perceived guilt of the other?121
If, as Justice Brennan observed in Browning-Ferris, "punitive dam-
ages, are imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to
do what they think is best,"' 122 under standards that are so vague that
they leave the public guessing their meaning and leave judges and jurors
free to decide without legally fixed standards what is prohibited and the
appropriate amount of penalty, it seems inescapable that they violate the
essentials of due process.'
23
Even if adequate standards might be postulated for determining
whether punitive damages ought to be imposed, the amount of those
damages is left completely indeterminate. 24 In most jurisdictions, there
are virtually no restrictions on the jury's authority to determine the se-
verity of punishment. Once the plaintiff has convinced the jury that a
prohibits and the Supreme Court has emphatically disallowed. See Erzoznik v. Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
120. McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 892, 220 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 42 Cal. 3d 835, 727 P.2d 711, 213 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1986). Although the Califor-
nia Supreme Court ultimately reversed the judgment of the court of appeals for lack of proof of
"actual malice," the point still remains: lack of adequate standards can result in bizarre jury
findings regarding damages.
121. Sack & Tofel, First Steps Down the Road Not Taken: Emerging Limitations on Libel
Damages, 90 DICK. L. REV. 609, 614-15 (1971).
122. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. See generally Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("A
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law."). See also Sable Communications of Califor-
nia v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (if
statute contains concepts that "cannot be defined with sufficient specificity," criminal sanctions
cannot constitutionally follow from it).
124. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 86-89 (1988) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Wheeler, supra note 103, at 285-86.
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defendant acted outrageously or, even carelessly, damages may be im-
posed, limited only by the "gentle rule" that the award not be exces-
sive."' "Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all."' 26
C. Appellate Review of Punitive Damage Awards Does Not Satisfy
Constitutional Requirements
Standardless and deferential appellate review of punitive damage
awards only aggravates due process concerns. Despite the long-standing
requirement of independent appellate review of the record to protect first
amendment rights,127 appellate courts have refused to disturb a jury's
award of punitive damages in libel cases unless they are "monstrously
excessive" or so large as to "shock the judicial conscience." 128 Such elu-
sive standards of review in the first amendment context afford too little
protection against abuse and are inconsistent with appellate courts' duty
to "independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient
to cross the constitutional threshold" marked by the first amendment. 29
The Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. explained that a jury's application of first amendment princi-
ples "is unlikely to be neutral with respect to the content of speech and
holds a real danger of becoming an instrument for the suppression of
those 'vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks'...
which must be protected if the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are to prevail."' 10 The threat of unrestrained damages
equally jeopardizes first amendment interests' 3 ' and the appellate court's
duty under Bose to protect against the entry of any judgment that en-
croaches upon protected speech 132 logically extends to review of the
damage awards included in such judgments, as well.
125. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (emphasis added).
126. Browning-Ferris, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. at 403 (statute that places no conditions upon jurors' power to impose
costs is unconstitutional).
127. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 284-86; Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 498-511 (1984).
128. See Brown & Williamson v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1141 (7th Cir. 1987) (multi-
million dollar punitive damage award upheld because jury was not "mere putty in the hands of
the plaintiff"); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1143-44 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1094 (1986); Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 257 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 883 (1984).
129. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (1989)
(quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 511).
130. 466 U.S. at 510 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1986) and
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270).
131. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (1974); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 770 (White, J.,
concurring).
132. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 510-11.
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Whether the conduct at issue warrants the imposition of enormous
civil fines meant to deter speech in the future is a determination that
cannot be reviewed solely for whether a jury acted out of "passion and
prejudice" or whether the amount is "excessive." Yet, without adequate
standards for reviewing these awards, appellate courts cannot possibly
operate as effective protectors against unconstitutional excess in the
award of damages. The seat-of-the-pants rule that has become, in es-
sence, "if it feels wrong, send it back," may catch some of the most ex-
treme abuses; but it is hardly a standard for promoting fairness or
predictability, and hardly one sensitive to the delicate task of measuring
the impact of the award on public speech.
V
The Public Policy Argument Against Punitive Damages
A. Punitive Damage Awards No Longer Serve Their Supposed Purposes
The traditional common law justifications offered for presumed and
punitive damages are: (1) to provide compensation in cases where harm
is difficult to prove; (2) to deter future undesirable conduct; and (3) to
punish or provide retribution for past reprehensible conduct.1 33 But the
Supreme Court has recognized that, in all but purely private libel cases,
presumed and punitive damages do not serve "[t]he legitimate state inter-
est underlying the law of libel [, i.e.,] the compensation of individuals for
the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." 134 Punitive dam-
ages "are wholly [unrelated] to th[is] state interest [because] they are not
compensation for injury." 135 The doctrine of presumed damages is also
essentially punitive, inviting juries "to punish unpopular opinion rather
than to compensate" and to grant "gratuitous awards of money damages
far in excess of any actual injury," a result in which "the States have no
substantial interest."
136
Even if the chilling effect of these non-compensatory awards could
be overlooked, it is highly doubtful whether they serve their own de-
clared purposes. Presumed damages were originally intended to compen-
sate plaintiffs in situations where proof of actual damages was impossible
and "where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circum-
stances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted
133. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50; Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760-61.
134. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
135. Id. at 350.
136. Id. at 349.
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in fact." 137 The same rationale has been suggested for punitive dam-
ages. 138 But that rationale grew from the early common law which se-
verely limited actual damages. 139 Modem damages theories are much
more expansive-courts no longer rely on restrictive definitions of "ac-
tual damages" and use relaxed standards of proof to allow compensation
for virtually every conceivable form of injury, "includ[ing] impairment of
reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering."'" Given this expansive reading of actual
damages in libel cases, the compensatory justification for presumed dam-
ages is no longer valid.14" '
It is equally doubtful whether punitive damages effectively serve
their supposed purpose as a deterrent to future wrongful conduct. "The
theory of deterrence assumes that the person to be deterred rationally
weighs the benefits and costs (including the possible punitive sanctions
discounted by the probability of their being imposed) likely to flow from
the contemplated conduct."' 42 In theory, this balancing process depends
on the potential defendant's ability to accurately predict the amount and
the likelihood of those costs, and deterrence is only effective when costs
are both certain to be imposed and optimal in amount, i.e., sufficient to
deter the targeted conduct without also deterring beneficial conduct.'43
Punitive damages are totally outside this theoretical framework.
They are awarded without any consideration of optimal costs, without
providing any meaningful cost information to potential defendants, and
with no degree of certainty that they will be assessed or in what amounts.
As a result, juries assess punitive damages without any consideration of,
much less confinement to, the amount strictly necessary to deter only
unprotected speech. This unpredictability, alone, defeats the theoretical
purposes of deterrence."
137. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 112, at 765 (4th ed. 1971)).
138. See Note, supra note 89, at 850.
139. See Wheeler, supra note 103, at 304-05.
140. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. See also Wheeler, supra note 103, at 305, 310.
141. The award of damages under such vague and indeterminate standards as "personal
humiliation" and "mental anguish" also undercuts the rationale that punitive damages are
necessary for deterrence and retribution. A jury's assessment of a plaintiff's humiliation and
anguish may well reflect these considerations as well. See Wheeler, supra note 103, at 310.
142. Id. at 306.
143. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
144. It might be argued that application of the actual malice standard reduces the unpre-
dictability of punitive damage awards, but experience refutes this assumption. Actual malice
may make liability more difficult to establish, but "courts still lack a way of judging in first
amendment terms the propriety of the amount of an award, however stupendous, once the
liability hurdle has been surmounted." Sack & Tofel, supra note 121, at 616 (footnote omit-
ted). Once a jury finds actual malice, its discretion to award presumed and punitive damages
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Finally, especially in the libel context, punitive damages do not ef-
fectively serve the purpose of punishment or retribution. The state has a
legitimate interest in retribution only when the wrongdoer has chosen to
commit a morally reprehensible act, knowing that it would likely cause
harm to another individual. '45 Punitive damages are not awarded ac-
cording to this standard, even when actual malice is shown. As previ-
ously noted, actual malice focuses primarily on the defendant's attitude
toward the facts and not the subjective intent to harm the plaintiff.'
46
The fact is that juries are generally free to use punitive damage awards to
punish the unpopular defendant -or to reward the popular plaintiff re-
gardless of the culpability of the defendant's conduct.' 47 As a result, de-
fendants are punished for who they are, whom they discuss, and how
they word that discussion-everything, in short, but what the state has a
theoretical interest in seeing punished. Punitive damages, therefore, do
not serve even the supposed purpose of retribution.
In short, presumed and punitive damages in the public speech con-
text do not "further ... the state interest in providing remedies for defa-
mation by ensuring that those remedies are effective."' 148 They do not
effectively deter, punish, or compensate for injury from unprotected
speech. Instead, these damages overcompensate plaintiffs while they de-
ter and punish protected speech.
B. Unrestrained Punitive Damage Awards Encourage Expensive and
Unnecessary Litigation
The prospect of virtually unlimited punitive damage awards against
large corporations changes the character of litigation. The punitive dam-
age lawsuit is not controlled by practical concerns of fair compensation
for real loss suffered. Instead, it becomes an expensive, time-consuming,
and wasteful exercise in litigation tactics-a high-stakes gamble on the
jury's emotions, with a prize limited only by the defendant's net worth.
And because the stakes are perceived to be so high, a punitive damages
case and its defense will take on the inflated character of a multi-million
dollar dispute, whether justified or not.
remains virtually unbridled. Potential-defendants still may or may not face heavy damage
awards depending on whom they talk about and the tone they take. And as previously noted,
there is no guarantee that the actual malice finding, itself, is not a reflection of the jury's desire
to punish the defendant. See text accompanying note 94, supra.
145. Note, supra note 89, at 851. See also Wheeler, supra note 103, at 311.
146. See Note, supra note 89, at 854; Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (1989).
147. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Smith v. Wade,
461 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
148. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761.
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The promise of unrestrained rewards can subvert even the most
carefully-drawn system for compensating actual injury and convert it to
a calculated appeal to jury passion and prejudice. The end result is an
irrational system in which the costs- "the encouragement of unneces-
sary litigation and the chilling of desirable conduct"- far outweigh the
alleged benefits of punitive damages."' Where the conduct chilled by
punitive damages is the discussion of public affairs, there are additional
and overriding first amendment concerns. The need to encourage unin-
hibited debate, to protect unpopular opinion, and to avoid the dangers of
self-censorship have all been recognized as first amendment goals that are
threatened by punitive damage awards.'" 0
C. Punitive Damages Are Arbitrarily Assessed Against Unpopular
Defendants and in Favor of Popular Plaintiffs
As noted, punitive damages are intended in theory to punish and
deter specific conduct that society finds reprehensible. In practice, how-
ever, juries often use this uncontrolled weapon to punish defendants not
for what they have done, but for who they are. It is no mere coincidence
that defendants such as Hustler and Penthouse magazines have suffered
punitive damage verdicts in the eight-figure range more than once. 1
Less dramatic, but more troublesome in many ways, is the number
of six- and seven-figure punitive awards that are imposed on news media
defendants almost as a matter of course once the jury finds for the plain-
tiff on the question of liability. When the jury in a libel case is invited to
"send a message" in the form of punitive damages that the defendant-
often a large corporation-cannot ignore, there is almost no guidance to
insure that either the message or its size is warranted by the defendant's
conduct, and not merely by the jurors' distaste for the defendant, its size,
or its financial net worth.
52
It is, perhaps, this characteristic of punitive damages that poses the
greatest threat in libel cases. By leaving jurors free to punish unpopular
defendants and their speech, the system not only offends traditional no-
tions of fairness and due process, but also undermines the careful struc-
149. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350; New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 278-79.
151. See, e.g., LDRC Bull. No. 18 (December 15, 1986) at 61-62 (citing Guccione v. Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc., No. 80AP-375 (Ohio Oct. 8, 1981) ($37,000,000); Lerman v. Flynt Dis-
tributing Co., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985) ($33,000,000);
Pring v. Penthouse International, 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) ($25,000,000)).
152. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Discussion of public affairs is
often marked by highly charged emotions, and jurymen, not unlike us all, are subject to those
emotions."). Excessive libel awards may reflect, in part, "localized judicial distaste for certain
publishers" and trial judges' "understandable, but constitutionally improper, distaste for the
defendant's publication." Van Alstyne, supra note 85, at 801, 808.
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ture of constitutional libel law. Ultimately, as the Supreme Court has
suggested from the beginning, the threat of damage awards intended to




The harm caused by punitive damage awards-the threat to first
amendment values, the overbroad deterrence of beneficial conduct, the
unnecessary drain on judicial resources, and above all, harm to the integ-
rity of fundamental concepts of due process-when weighed against the
theoretical justifications offered in the defense of such awards, compels
the conclusion that punitive damages in libel cases are a remedy that
society cannot afford and the Constitution does not permit.

